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Abstract
Background: Alignment between physicians and hospitals is of major importance to the health care sector. Two
distinct approaches to align the medical staff with the hospital have characterized previous research. The first
approach, economic integration, is rooted in the economic literature, in which alignment is realized by financial
means. The second approach, noneconomic integration, represents a sociological perspective emphasizing the
cooperative nature of their relationship.
Discussion: Empirical studies and management theory (agency theory and social exchange theory) are used to
increase holistic understanding of physician hospital alignment. On the one hand, noneconomic integration is
identified as a means to realize a cooperative relationship. On the other hand, economic integration is studied as a
way to align financial incentives. The framework is developed around two key antecedent factors which play an
important role in aligning the medical staff. First, provider financial risk bearing is identified as a driving force
towards closer integration. Second, organizational trust is believed to be important in explaining the causal relation
between noneconomic and economic integration.
Summary: Hospital financial risk bearing creates a greater need for closer cooperation with the medical staff and
alignment of financial incentives. Noneconomic integration lies at the very basis of alignment. It contributes
directly to alignment through the norm of reciprocity and indirectly by building trust with the medical staff, laying
the foundation for alignment of financial incentives.
Background
The relationship between the hospital and its medical
staff is an important area of academic research and a
main concern of hospital executives, given the impact
on quality of provided care [1], hospitals’ financial suc-
cess [2] and cost-effective healthcare delivery [3]. Inter-
nationally, hospitals have evolved from a physician
workshop to accountable organizations, charged with
the development of internal organizations where quality
and cost effectiveness go hand in hand [4]. Conse-
quently, cooperation and alignment between hospitals
and their physicians has become paramount to enhance
hospital performance. However, conflicting incentives
between physicians and hospitals are often cited as a
major obstacle to effective collaboration and threatens
the long-standing assumption that physicians and hospi-
tals share common interests [5,6]. Prior research has
offered a number of important insights into alignment
of the medical staff with the goals and objectives of the
hospital. Three approaches can be identified. The first
approach is rooted in the economic literature, building
on the model of the homo economicus, in which align-
ment is realized by ‘hard’ financial means (economic
integration). The second represents a more ‘soft’ socio-
logical perspective, emphasizing the cooperative nature
of their relationship (noneconomic integration). The
third focuses on the clinical dimension of their relation,
the coordination of patient care (clinical integration). In
this paper we focus primarily on the first (economic
integration) and second category (noneconomic integra-
tion). It has been argued that clinical integration is the
apex of the three and is causally dependent on the
development and successful execution of the other two
[7,8]. As a result we argue that clinical integration is an
outcome of alignment, defined as the degree to which
physicians and hospitals share the same mission and* Correspondence: jeroen.trybou@ugent.be
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vision, goals and objectives, and strategies, and work
toward their accomplishment [9].
In this paper we focus on the importance of an effec-
tive, high quality relationship between hospitals and
their medical staff resulting in increased alignment
between both. Up to now there has not been an attempt
to integrate the sociological perspective with the eco-
nomic insights. We attempt to address this knowledge
gap by developing a conceptual framework resulting in a
practical and holistic understanding of physician hospital
alignment. The model as depicted in figure 1 proposes
relationships between important antecedents and physi-
cian hospital integration. First, provider financial risk
bearing is identified as the main reason for increased
integration between hospitals and their medical staff.
However, because physicians mostly operate in a group
setting, physician’s individual financial risk bearing is
pooled at the group level. Consequently it is important
to incorporate physician financial risk bearing at the
individual - and the group level. Furthermore, we argue
that both integration strategies should be seen as com-
plementary, rather than isolated strategies as there is an
anticipated causal effect between both. As such, this
paper proceeds previous work and deals with Granovet-
ter’s embeddedness paradigm that an inquiry focusing
solely on economic or social aspects is not an accurate
view [10]. Accordingly, next to risk-antecedent, repre-
senting the economic perspective, the sociological per-
spective - represented by trust - has been included
when investigating physician-hospital alignment. More
specifically, we argue that by building trust through
non-economic integration strategies, increased financial
risk sharing between both can be realized.
However, it should be noted that when alignment is
considered as a development process in a longitudinal
sense, outcomes can cause feedback and have a recur-
sive relationship with the integration strategies. Simi-
larly, economic integration also influences hospital and
physician risk bearing. Therefore, we note that this
model is a partial model and cannot represent all possi-




Several theories have been developed that offer useful
insights in the complex, interdependent relationship
between hospitals and physicians. This paper draws on
agency theory [11] and social exchange theory [12] to
increase understanding of the mechanisms used to align
their interests. The principal goal of agency theory is to
determine the most efficient contract which is consid-
ered a highly relevant aspect of our research problem.
Specifically, agency theory describes the dilemma pre-
sent when a principal engages another party, the agent,
to perform a service. The agent does not have exactly
the same objectives or motivations as the principal and
does not necessarily act in the best interest of the prin-
cipal. The principal goal of agency theory is to deter-
mine the most efficient contract using a unique
framework based on outcome uncertainty, the associated
financial risk and information asymmetry. Consequently,
the principles of agency theory provide a useful frame-
work to study economic integration strategies [13,14].
Although agency theory can be described as one of the
most influential and widely used theories to study
Figure 1 An integrative model of physician hospital alignment.
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problems of relationships with a cooperative structure,
additional theories can help to capture the greater com-
plexity and improves understanding [11]. More specifi-
cally, in case of physician hospital alignment, the
importance of noneconomic integration strategies is dif-
ficult to capture with the agency theory framework. We
argue that social exchange theory can be a very useful
perspective for the study of these non-economic integra-
tion strategies. According to this theory organizational
members tend to reciprocate beneficial treatment they
receive with positive work-related behavior and tend to
reciprocate detrimental treatment they receive with
negative work-related behavior [12,15]. In this sense, a
good underlying cooperative relationship with the medi-
cal staff leads to increased alignment.
The need for alignment
Internationally, hospitals are confronted with continuous
pressures to contain costs and simultaneously improve
health care quality. As a consequence, the relationship
between hospitals and their medical staff has changed
significantly over the past several decades. Traditionally
physicians have been relatively independent of hospitals
and have used them as workshops in which they carry
out their professional services. The Hospital Physician
Relationship (HPR) was characterized by unique, sym-
biotic interdependence in which the two parties had
compatible incentives to increase the volume of care
using the latest technology, while maximizing the pro-
fessional autonomy of the physician [16]. This profes-
sional autonomy was reinforced by the fragmented
financing system, which ignored the interrelatedness of
the actions of physicians and hospitals in the treatment
of their patients. Physicians were paid on a fee-for-
service basis and hospitals were paid on the basis of
costs incurred [17]. However, the financial relationship
between hospitals and physicians has changed. Not only
have margins declined due to increased complexity, ris-
ing costs and more restrictive reimbursement schemes
[18], providers are also confronted with increased finan-
cial accountability for the delivered care, introduced by
methods of prospective payment and forms of managed
competition [19,20]. Furthermore, recognition that the
health care system suffers from serious gaps in quality
(i.e. medical errors, unnecessary differences in practice
patterns and unintended variation in outcomes) has sti-
mulated a broad array of public-, and private-sector
initiatives to improve performance [21]. Accreditation,
public reporting of hospital quality and value based pur-
chasing (i.e. pay for quality) have become the locus of
debate and have emerged as widely advocated strategies
[22]. As a result, hospitals and physicians are no longer
insulated from the financial consequences of their deci-
sions. Finally, next to the degree of provider financial
risk installed by the base compensation scheme and reg-
ulatory framework the degree of risk assumed by the
hospital also depends on the alignment of incentives
with the medical staff [23]. Given the physician auton-
omy in medical decision making, the medical staff con-
trols many patient care decisions that influence hospital
costs and quality, and by extension hospital financial
performance. Consequently the degree of risk assumed
by the hospital also depends on the alignment of incen-
tives with the medical staff. More specifically, in the
situations where the hospital bears a certain degree of
financial risk (e.g. per case payment) and the medical
staff’s financial responsibility for their actions remains
obsolete or limited (e.g. fee-for-service) the hospital’s
risk is considerably increased.
The medical group level
Previous research on physician incentives identified the
size and compensation structure of the medical group as
an important matter to the risk distribution problem
inherent to health care delivery. The group level creates
an important possibility to limit individual financial risk
by pooling the risk within the group. This results in
‘risk pools’ which can be described as a number of phy-
sicians that are paid collectively and thus share financial
risk for the cost of patient care [24]. As the individual
physicians are sometimes paid on a different basis than
the group, a risk adjustment can be made at the indivi-
dual practitioner level. Therefore, risk assumption may
operate at different levels in organizational settings, the
first via a group effect and the latter at the individual
physician level [25,26]. We argue that this group level
has an important buffering effect in aligning financial
incentives between the hospital and the medical staff. In
a similar vein, the recent discussion in the US about the
role of accountable care organizations in future health
care delivery reflects our argument. This new type of
organization is built around providers and differs from
historical managed care organizations (primarily health
maintenance organizations). Rather than holding
insurers at full financial risk for the cost of care these
organizations focus on provider financial risk bearing at
the group level [27].
Noneconomic Integration
Theoretically rooted in social exchange theory, noneco-
nomic integration strategies aim at optimizing the work-
ing relationship between the hospital and the medical
staff. Research focusing on these strategies suggests that
more emphasis should be placed on the underlying
cooperative aspects of their relationship instead of the
contractual, economic ties [9]. Within previous research,
a distinction can be drawn between administrative lin-
kages related to shared decision making and operational
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linkages focusing on supporting physicians in practicing
medicine. First, it has been argued that physician involve-
ment in planning and decision making holds a great pro-
mise for aligning hospital and physician interests [28].
This form of noneconomic integration is believed to
increase their fiduciary responsibility and exposure to
tough decisions, both of which are likely to increase phy-
sician sensitivity to hospital performance and the creation
of a more cooperative decision-making environment [29].
Second, aiming at the provision of value-added contribu-
tions to the physician(group), operational support can be
a valuable instrument to increase alignment. It allows the
physicians to operate more effectively and efficiently in a
complex and changing healthcare environment in which
they have to deal with a myriad of demands. These
operational linkages create true interdependence by pro-
viding valued resources to the physician group, which
results in increased organizational commitment from the
physicians receiving these resources [30].
Economic Integration
Building further on the agency framework, we now con-
centrate on shared risk and gains in order to realize
alignment. Within previous research, the question how
financial incentives affect physician decision-making has
been frequently addressed and it is widely believed that
the method of payment of physicians affects their clini-
cal and professional behavior [31]. However, we argue
that the analysis of financial incentives cannot be sepa-
rated from the base compensation scheme by which the
providers are paid. This base compensation scheme cre-
ates its own incentives, which the supplemental eco-
nomic incentives reinforce or counteract to realize
increased alignment [32]. Consequently, the effect and
use of economic incentives varies according to this base
compensation. Given the variance in base compensation,
this makes a review and interpretation of the findings
about the effect of economic integration strategies diffi-
cult. We respond to this challenge by incorporating the
macro level into the model by the risk antecedent.
Based on agency theory, we argue that the base com-
pensation scheme results in a varying risk distribution
to the hospital and physician, on which supplementary
economic alignment can be realized by a financial agree-
ment (e.g. gainsharing and physician ownership).
Organizational Trust
Next to risk, organizational trust lies at the heart of the
management field and is vital in examining the princi-
pal-professional exchange [33]. In case of the hospital
physician relationship, it is considered to be a social
antecedent and critical concern of both parties [9].
Trust can be described as the willingness to be vulner-
able to actions of another party irrespective of the ability
to monitor or control that other party, making the risk
antecedent, the driving force behind our conceptual fra-
mework, an essential component of trust [34,35]. Fol-
lowing agency theory, economic integration strategies
give the possibility to align the interests of the physician
by means of a contract. However, physicians may see lit-
tle value added form their economic ties to hospitals.
They even may view such connections as burdensome,
if not antithetical to the traditional values of autonomy
and freedom of external control [36]. Therefore next to
the assessment of the risk by weighing the likelihood of
positive and negative outcomes that might occur, trust
can be considered crucial in intensifying the economic
ties with the medical staff. In our model, we conceptua-
lize non-economic integration strategies as a comple-
mentary management approach, primarily rooted in
social exchange theory. Trust has emerged as a central
concept within this theory and it has consistently been
found as an outcome of co-operative behavior [37].
Therefore, we argue that by including trust as an ante-
cedent to alignment we increase significantly the expla-
natory power of our model.
Summary
The purpose of this article was to rethink physician
hospital alignment. It extends current research by devel-
oping a conceptual framework incorporating both eco-
nomic and noneconomic alignment and the causal
relationship between both. This conceptual framework
synthesizes insights from the literature and provides a
holistic understanding of the interdependent relationship
between hospitals and their medical staff. In doing so,
this study challenges scholars and practitioners to con-
sider the complexity inherent to the alignment problem
more holistically. Additionally it may provide guidance
for future research from a variety of different disciplines.
Our discussion has shown that hospitals are charged
with developing internal organizations where quality and
cost effectiveness are at the center of their attention.
Consequently the historical separation of administrative
and clinical decision making is eliminated. Unfortu-
nately, conflicting incentives between physicians and
hospitals are often a major obstacle to effective colla-
boration and alignment of the medical staff with the
hospital objectives and goals. In our paper we argue that
noneconomic integration lies at the very basis of align-
ment. It contributes directly to alignment through the
norm of reciprocity and indirectly by building trust with
the medical staff, laying the foundation for alignment of
financial incentives.
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